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PROSECUTORIAL NULLIFICATION 
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.* 
Abstract: It is beyond peradventure that American prosecutors have ple-
nary charging discretion in criminal cases; prosecutors with admissible 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt may nevertheless decline to seek a con-
viction. Such declinations are sometimes rooted in legitimate law en-
forcement rationales, such as the absence of sufficient enforcement re-
sources. A prosecutor, however, might decline a meritorious prosecution 
simply because he or she disagrees with the applicable law or its applica-
tion in the particular case. This prerogative to engage in what this Article 
terms “prosecutorial nullification” has been under-theorized, but raises a 
number of profound questions: Is prosecutorial nullification a subspecies 
of legitimate prosecutorial discretion, or should it be considered an extra-
legal departure from established rules? What is the conceptual relation-
ship of prosecutorial nullification to jury nullification and other like ac-
tions of discretion-wielding criminal justice actors? Do the unique institu-
tional role and function of the American prosecutor provide a sufficient 
rationale for the power to frustrate legislative judgment and undermine 
(or promote) societal values and norms? This Article seeks to sharpen the 
definition of “prosecutorial nullification,” contextualize it within the 
broader conversation about discretion in the criminal process, and offer a 
nuanced account of its relationship with prosecutorial authority, legiti-
macy, and the rule of law. 
Introduction 
 Discretion pervades the American criminal justice system.1 Al-
though prosecutorial discretion is largely unreviewable and un-
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1244 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1243 
checked—and, therefore, subject to abuse—it is essential to the effi-
cient operation of the criminal justice system.2 Full enforcement of the 
law would not only be impractical, but also unwise. Prosecutors are ex-
pected to make decisions regarding which cases will be prosecuted out 
of the many which could be prosecuted.3 Any number of factors might 
influence the prosecutor’s discretion in this regard, including resource 
limitations, law enforcement priorities, needs or wishes of the victim, 
and the perceived public interest.4 Yet, when, if ever, is the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion better characterized as “prosecutorial nullifica-
tion”? 
 When a jury acquits despite sufficient proof of guilt, we describe 
this as “jury nullification.” There seems to be consensus over the defini-
tion of jury nullification, even where there is often disagreement over 
whether a jury has nullified in a given case.5 Despite the occasional use 
of the term in court reporters and legal scholarship, however, a similar 
consensus has not been reached on the definition of “prosecutorial nul-
lification.” When a prosecutor declines to prosecute despite sufficient 
proof of guilt, we are unsure what to call it. Some might characterize it 
as an instance of prosecutorial nullification, while others may character-
ize it as a garden variety exercise of prosecutorial discretion—a topic 
thoroughly explored through decades of thoughtful scholarly commen-
tary.6 
                                                                                                                      
 
2 See, e.g., Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A 
Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules 43 (1973) (quoting Kenneth Culp 
Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 216–17 (1969)). 
3 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address at the Second Annual Conference of United 
States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)) (“One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prose-
cutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the 
cases in which he receives complaints.”); Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law En-
forcement, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 427, 427 (1960) (“If every policeman, every prosecutor, every 
court, and every post-sentence agency performed his or its responsibility in strict accor-
dance with rules of law, precisely and narrowly laid down, the criminal law would be or-
dered but intolerable.”). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977) (“The decision to file 
criminal charges, with the awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a 
wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the Government’s case, in order to 
determine whether the prosecution would be in the public interest.”) (footnote omitted). 
5 “Jury nullification” is defined as “the power of the jury to disregard the judge’s in-
structions and acquit even in the face of conclusive proof of what the judge has defined as 
an offense.” William H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 217, 
225 (1996). 
6 Much of the excellent contemporary scholarship on prosecutorial discretion cited 
throughout this Article was undoubtedly influenced by several classic works on the subject. 
See generally Davis supra note 2; Kadish & Kadish, supra note 2; Frank W. Miller, Prosecu-
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 This Article treats prosecutorial nullification as a distinct species of 
prosecutorial discretion that presents a set of intriguing, important, 
and complex questions: Is prosecutorial nullification an extra-legal de-
parture from established rules governing prosecutorial authority? What 
is the conceptual relationship of prosecutorial nullification to jury nul-
lification and other similar actions of discretion-wielding criminal jus-
tice actors? Do the unique institutional role and function of the Ameri-
can prosecutor provide a sufficient rationale for the power to frustrate 
legislative judgment and undermine (or promote) societal values and 
norms? This Article seeks to answer these and other questions while 
contextualizing prosecutorial nullification within the broader conversa-
tion regarding perceived departures from legal rules and norms in the 
administration of criminal justice. 
 Part I of this Article sketches a working definition of prosecutorial 
nullification, which distinguishes it from prosecutorial discretion more 
generally.7 Based upon the premise that the appropriate degree of pro-
secutorial discretion resides somewhere on the spectrum between “full 
enforcement” and “complete discretion,” the Article offers a typography 
of declination rationales improperly characterized as instances of prose-
cutorial nullification.8 This Part concludes with a consideration of those 
declination rationales presenting greater challenges to the tidy categori-
zation as instances of either prosecutorial discretion or prosecutorial 
nullification.9 Part II uses a number of analytical touchstones to exam-
ine whether prosecutorial nullification is compatible with the rule of 
law.10 This Part explores whether prosecutors have a greater claim to 
legitimacy when engaging in nullification than do juries and other dis-
cretion-wielding criminal justice actors. In answering this question, Part 
II considers the unique role of the American prosecutor, democratic 
accountability, decision-making transparency, professional norms, ex-
pertise, and institutional and other constraints.11 Part III briefly con-
templates the implications of acknowledging prosecutorial nullification 
as a distinct species of prosecutorial discretion.12 Highlighting the bene-
fits and burdens prosecutorial nullification creates for the administra-
                                                                                                                      
tion: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime (Frank J. Remington ed., 1969); 
James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981). 
7 See infra notes 15–69 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 70–120 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 89–120 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 121–155 and accompanying text. 
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tion of criminal justice, this Part argues that the recognition of prosecu-
tors’ ability to engage in nullification should impact the way in which we 
choose and regulate prosecutors.13 Part III concludes by suggesting po-
tential mechanisms for regulating prosecutorial nullification and ensur-
ing that we select prosecutors who will use this power judiciously.14 
I. Toward a Coherent Definition of Prosecutorial 
Nullification 
 Although the literature on prosecutorial discretion is voluminous, 
there is scarce scholarly treatment of “prosecutorial nullification.”15 
Likewise, court reporters contain precious few judicial opinions that 
even mention “prosecutorial nullification” or some derivation of the 
phrase.16 Yet, Judge Jack Weinstein, in an article exploring jury nullifi-
                                                                                                                      
 
13 See infra notes 123–131 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 132–155 and accompanying text. 
15 See, e.g., Francis A. Allen, The Law as a Path to the World, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 157, 161 
(1978) (“A law-giver who has misjudged the community’s sense of propriety and proportion 
by condemning acts that are widely approved or authorizing penalties too extreme, may en-
counter the phenomenon of nullification: Prosecutors may refuse to prosecute; juries may 
disregard the evidence and acquit; and judges may in myriad ways frustrate the enforcement 
of the law.”); Schuyler C. Wallace, Nullification: A Process of Government, 45 Pol. Sci. Q. 347, 
348 (1930) (describing results of a survey of 3000 prosecutors across the United States, many 
of whom “boldly admit[ted] that they nullify both laws and ordinances whenever and wher-
ever it seems desirable”); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Discretion and Constitutional 
Design, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 703, 735–36 n.175 (2008) (“[P]rosecutors may ‘nullify’ a criminal 
statute by refusing to enforce it.”). 
Although largely beyond the scope of this Article, some have applied the label “prose-
cutorial nullification” to other types of prosecutorial decisions as well. See, e.g., Donna M. 
Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 Crime & Just. 81, 111 
(2000) (describing as “prosecutorial nullification” a prosecutor’s failure to transfer a juve-
nile to adult court as required by certain statutory criteria); Christopher Kennedy, Criminal 
Sentences for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 443, 456–57 (1985) 
(characterizing as “prosecutorial nullification” the “hesitancy of prosecutors to recom-
mend . . . fines large enough to neutralize the profit motive of corporate crime”); Michael 
L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599, 703–04 (1989–90) (describing as “a sort of prosecutorial nullifica-
tion” the situation in which a prosecutor does not forcefully counter an insanity defense 
put forth by a defendant who, though sympathetic, does not meet the legal standard for 
insanity); Stephen J. Rackmill, Printzlien’s Legacy, The “Brooklyn Plan,” A.K.A. Deferred Prosecu-
tion, Fed. Probation, June 1996, at 8, 8 (noting that prior to the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act, which provides safeguards to segregate juvenile offenders from adult detain-
ees, prosecutors with no other choice would often “nullify the process by declining 
prosecution in the interests of the youngster’s welfare”). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2005) (“It 
is also possible that an attorney general might decide not to enforce, or at least to under-
enforce, politically controversial laws or laws that, in the attorney general’s view, are un-
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cation, argued that of all the nullification in the criminal justice system, 
“the greatest nullification takes place as a result of decisions not to 
prosecute . . . .”17 A prosecutor can decline, for any reason or no reason 
at all,18 to proceed against an individual even though there is likely suf-
ficient evidence to convict.19 In the same way other criminal justice ac-
tors—such as law enforcement officers, petit and grand juries, and 
judges—have the ability to forbear in the justified enforcement of the 
criminal law or punishment for its violation,20 prosecutors may and do 
decide—even against the weight of the evidence—that a prosecution 
will not go forward. This applies not only to the binary charg-
                                                                                                                      
constitutional. In effect, a decision not to prosecute someone who would likely be indicted 
and could be convicted is a form of prosecutorial nullification.”). 
17 The Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and 
Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 239, 246 (1992). Judge Weins-
tein believes that prosecutorial nullification dwarfs grand jury and petit jury nullification. 
See id. at 246–47 (“Compared to prosecutorial nullification, grand jury refusal to indict and 
petit jury refusal to find guilt are of minor significance.”); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Of Dissent and Discretion, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 685, 686 (2000) (“Despite all the 
famous cases of alleged juror nullification, it is ‘prosecutorial nullification’ —more com-
monly known as ‘prosecutorial discretion’ —that plays the greatest part in keeping male-
factors out of jail.”). 
The closest competitor, perhaps, would be law enforcement. Of course, police are also 
called to make discretionary calls, and also operate under the reality that full enforcement 
of the law is both unwise and impractical. See, e.g., Kadish & Kadish, supra note 2, at 73–
80; Nirej Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. Crim. L. & Criminology (forthcoming 
2011); Weinstein, supra, at 246. Furthermore, many potential cases brought to the atten-
tion of the police are never passed on to the prosecutor. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Police 
Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Jus-
tice, 69 Yale L.J. 543, 561–62 (1960). Yet, cases can be generated by the prosecutor, and 
furthermore, the prosecutor gets the final discretionary decision on all cases the police 
desire to pursue. 
18 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 
409, 431 n.33 (1976); Ellen S. Podgor, Race-ing Prosecutors’ Ethics Codes, 44 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 
L. Rev. 461, 467 (2009). A narrow exception to prosecutors’ broad discretion can be found 
in the Constitution’s prohibition of selective prosecution on racial and other impermissi-
ble grounds. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 456 (1962). Selective prosecution claims, however, are often stymied by the diffi-
culty in obtaining discovery. See Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: Power and Privilege of 
Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 42–46 (1998). 
19 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 734–36; Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 521, 532 n.72 (2005) (“[A] decision not to indict ‘has long been regarded as 
the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is that the Executive who is 
charged by the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”’”) (quot-
ing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)); see also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et 
Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 825 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
20 See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 348–70; Fairfax, supra note 15, at 732–43. See gener-
ally Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1785 (2007). 
1248 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1243 
ing/declination decision, but also to a prosecutor opting to charge a 
lesser offense than that which she can readily prove in a case.21 
 Perhaps the scarcity of references to “prosecutorial nullification” is 
a by-product of the lack of consensus and clarity as to what it is.22 Whe-
reas a definitional and conceptual consensus has been reached on “jury 
nullification,” so-called “prosecutorial nullification” seems to have es-
caped thorough consideration and analysis.23 Commentators rarely ac-
                                                                                                                      
 
21 When the phrase “decline to prosecute” is used in this Article, it includes both opt-
ing for a significantly less serious charge than is warranted and the withdrawal or nolle pro-
sequi of an earlier-filed, readily provable charge. A prosecutor’s decision to opt for a lesser 
charge than is warranted by the criminal conduct might be driven, for example, by a desire 
to avoid the legislature’s mandatory minimum sentencing scheme. See, e.g., David Bjerk, 
Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing, 48 J.L. & Econ. 591, 594 (2005); Daniel P. Kessler & Anne M. Piehl, The Role of 
Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L., Econ. & Org. 256, 274 (1998); Vorenberg, 
supra note 6, at 1529. 
Like the decision to charge in the first instance, the decision to nolle prosequi or move 
to dismiss charges is subject to very little review, except that the judge in some instances 
must formally grant the motion. See, e.g., Karen H. Schneider et al., Note, The Special Prose-
cutor in the Federal System: A Proposal, 11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 577, 584 (1973); Andrew Sidman, 
The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 Am. U. L. Rev. 754, 784 n.157 (1976). For 
purposes of this Article, undercharging and dismissals are included in the concept of pro-
secutorial declination, unless otherwise noted. 
22 This is not so with jury nullification. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “jury nullification” 
as “[the] knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the law ei-
ther because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than 
the case itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the [juror’s] sense of jus-
tice, morality, or fairness.” Black’s Law Dictionary 936 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis add-
ed). Leading commentators on both sides of the normative debate over jury nullification 
seem to adhere to this definition as well. See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullifica-
tion: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 700 (1995) (“When a jury 
disregards evidence presented at trial and acquits an otherwise guilty defendant, because 
the jury objects to the law the defendant violated or to the application of the law to the 
defendant, it has practiced jury nullification.”); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullifi-
cation, 82 Va. L. Rev. 253, 253 (1996) (“Nullification occurs when the defendant’s guilt is 
clear beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury, based on its own sense of justice or fairness, 
decides to acquit.”). The same is true for courts, which fully acknowledge (though typically 
condemn) the practice and power of jury nullification. See, e.g., State v. Depaz, 204 P.3d 
217, 227 n.1 (Wash. 2009) (following Black’s Law Dictionary definition); Holden v. State, 
788 N.E.2d 1253, 1254 (Ind. 2003). Indeed, the mainstream discussion surrounding jury 
nullification has moved far beyond the foundational questions of whether it exists and what 
it is, and regularly explores when jury nullification has occurred and what challenges it 
poses for the rule of law and the fair and efficient administration of justice. See, e.g., Darryl 
K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1149, 1149–53 (1997); 
Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 582, 582–84 (1939); 
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 877, 947–58 (1999). 
23 See, e.g., Sean Keveney, The Dishonesty Rule: A Proposal for Reform, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 381, 
394 n.72 (2002) (“Although most academic interest focuses on jury nullification, prosecu-
tors and judges wield a surprising amount of discretion. The exercise of ‘prosecutorial 
nullification’ is a recognized aspect of the enforcement of the criminal law.”). It is tempt-
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knowledge “prosecutorial nullification” (at least not explicitly), instead 
recognizing prosecutorial “leniency” as an unremarkable species of 
prosecutorial discretion.24 At the same time, some observers who do 
acknowledge “prosecutorial nullification” seem willing to simply apply 
the label to any circumstance where a prosecutor has enough evidence 
to convict but declines to prosecute anyway.25 Prosecutorial nullifica-
tion deserves a more nuanced analysis, which considers the reasons for 
the prosecutorial declination and distinguishes nullification from 
prosecutorial discretion more generally. 
                                                                                                                     
 Given the lack of common understanding regarding prosecutorial 
nullification as its own concept, this Part attempts to provide a working 
definition of prosecutorial nullification. Section A identifies the full 
spectrum of prosecutorial discretion.26 Section B then highlights cir-
 
ing to simply analogize prosecutorial nullification to jury nullification and borrow the 
definition from the latter. However, as is discussed below, there are important reasons why 
prosecutorial nullification deserves careful analysis, distinct from that of other discretion-
wielding actors in the criminal justice system. See infra notes 70–120 and accompanying 
text. 
24 See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1551–52; see also Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendu-
lum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420, 1422 (2008). 
Prosecutors may decline to bring charges against someone they know com-
mitted the offense for any number of reasons, including that the facts of the 
case warrant lenient treatment. Similarly, judges can decide that, notwith-
standing that a defendant has been found guilty, the circumstances of the 
case call for no or minimal punishment. That looks something like nullifica-
tion, although few if anyone call it that. 
Lance Cassak & Milton Heumann, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Reconsideration of Informing 
Jurors About Punishment in Determinate- and Mandatory-Sentencing Cases, 4 Rutgers J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y 411, 494–95 (2007). 
25 See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1703, 1724 
(1993) (characterizing a discussion of classic prosecutorial discretion as pertaining to 
“prosecutorial nullification”) (citing Kadish & Kadish, supra note 2, at 45–66). 
Although the term “nullification” is generally thought to be pejorative (particularly in 
the context of jury nullification), the consequences of nullification are not necessarily 
undesirable. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 15, at 708, 717. For example, the juries that nulli-
fied in order to resist the enforcement of unfair slavery and Jim Crow–era laws are often 
celebrated today. On the other hand, juries throughout American history also have been 
accused of nullifying in order to frustrate enforcement of civil rights laws or to impede 
prosecutions of those charged with racial violence. Likewise, a prosecutor might decline to 
prosecute a remorseful individual who, through a brief lapse in judgment, committed a 
nonviolent shoplifting offense. A prosecutor, due to his or her odious personal beliefs, 
might also refuse to prosecute any defendants for domestic violence offenses. Both of 
these exercises of prosecutorial discretion would be described as prosecutorial nullifica-
tion under this Article’s definition, but they obviously have drastically different normative 
implications. See infra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 30–35 and accompanying text. 
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cumstances of prosecutorial discretion that are properly characterized 
as prosecutorial nullification.27 Prosecutorial declinations that are not 
properly characterized as prosecutorial nullification are examined in 
Section C.28 Finally, Section D examines declination rationales that 
cannot be so easily characterized.29 
A. Spectrum of Discretion: Full Enforcement and Complete Discretion Models 
 Imagine a spectrum along which varying assessments of the ap-
propriate scope of a prosecutor’s discretion are plotted. At one end of 
the spectrum is the “full enforcement” model, in which it is urged that 
a prosecutor has the duty to prosecute every meritorious case that 
comes across her desk. Where a credible allegation is supported by suf-
ficient admissible evidence, the prosecutor must pursue the charges. 
Any failure to do so—for whatever reason—is a breach of that duty. At 
the other end of the spectrum is the “complete discretion” model, 
which assumes that a prosecutor has plenary discretion to bring 
charges in only those cases that she deems appropriate and to decline 
to prosecute those cases that she does not. Under this view, a prosecu-
tor’s decision not to charge in a given case—for any reason at all—is 
deemed an appropriate exercise of discretion. 
 This spectrum is important to consider because one’s definition of 
“prosecutorial nullification” (or determination of whether it even ex-
ists) is ultimately determined by where on this spectrum one’s view of 
the proper scope of prosecutorial discretion falls. Certainly, given the 
realities of modern criminal justice, few, if any, would lay claim to a vi-
sion of prosecutorial discretion residing at either extreme. Both the full 
enforcement model and the complete discretion model carry negative 
consequences most would be unwilling to accept. Full enforcement of 
the law would be deemed by most as too inflexible and resource inten-
sive to be workable in our society.30 Likewise, complete and unfettered 
discretion might too easily lead to the sort of arbitrary or improperly 
discriminatory criminal law enforcement our legal culture has shunned 
                                                                                                                      
27 See infra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 58–69 and accompanying text. 
30 See, e.g., Kadish & Kadish, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Davis, supra note 2, at 216–
17). Professor Donald Dripps does argue, however, that adoption of a full enforcement 
model would compel legislatures to excise unfair or unwise laws from the statute books, as 
their burdens would fall on everyone, privileged or otherwise. See Donald A. Dripps, Over-
criminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 Penn St. L. Rev. 
1155, 1176 (2005). 
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as a normative and constitutional matter.31 Thus, as we move away from 
either extreme, we find common articulations of the scope of prosecu-
torial discretion. 
 At the complete discretion extreme, prosecutorial nullification 
does not exist. There is no such thing as prosecutorial nullification be-
cause there are no implicit constraints on the ability of the prosecutor 
to exercise discretion. As long as these exercises of discretion do not 
contravene any formal legal limits (such as constitutional prohibitions 
of discrimination on impermissible grounds), they do not constitute 
nullification. Thus, the closer one is to the complete discretion end of 
the spectrum, the less likely she will be to characterize a prosecutorial 
declination as prosecutorial nullification. 
 At the full enforcement extreme, any decision not to prosecute 
where there exists sufficient evidence to convict would constitute pro-
secutorial nullification. Under this conception, the prosecutor’s job is 
to fully enforce the law. Where the prosecutor is made aware of con-
duct that contravenes a criminal statute and has access to admissible 
evidence sufficient to support a likely conviction, she should prosecute 
the case.32 If a prosecutor declines to prosecute a case she likely would 
have won, she has nullified. The closer to the full enforcement end of 
the spectrum one’s understanding of the scope of prosecutorial discre-
tion is, the more likely she is to consider a prosecutorial declination to 
be prosecutorial nullification. 
 Most courts and commentators, not surprisingly, seem to situate the 
scope of discretion somewhere between the two extremes, but much 
closer to the “complete discretion” end of the spectrum.33 In this view, a 
prosecutor may decline to prosecute a matter even if she has enough 
evidence to convict. Although prosecutors are thought to have broad 
authority to make decisions on grounds other than the sufficiency of the 
                                                                                                                      
31 See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365 (“There is no doubt that the breadth of discre-
tion that our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the poten-
tial for both individual and institutional abuse.”); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557–58 
(1965) (discussing the nexus between unfettered discretion of public officials and the 
danger of selective enforcement in violation of equal protection principles). 
32 It is possible near the full enforcement end of the spectrum for there to be respect 
for “parameters of acceptable deviance” in which a norm develops permitting slight viola-
tions of the law without enforcement. See, e.g., Mark A. Edwards, Law and the Parameters of 
Acceptable Deviance, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 49, 56 (2006). Such a norm, however, 
which merely supplements the underlying applicable legal rule, still operates as a con-
straint on discretion. 
33 See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832; United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 794 (1977). 
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evidence,34 the critical question for defining prosecutorial nullification 
is which non-evidentiary grounds may legitimately inform prosecutorial 
discretion.35 
B. What Prosecutorial Nullification Is 
 This Article characterizes “prosecutorial nullification,” as those 
circumstances in which a prosecutor has sufficient evidence to secure a 
conviction against a defendant for conduct that violates a criminal law, 
but declines prosecution because of a disagreement with that law or 
because of the belief that the application of that law to a particular de-
fendant or in a particular context would be unwise or unfair.36 
 There are certain examples where an exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion would certainly fall within this definition of prosecutorial nulli-
fication. The first of these is where a prosecutor declines a prosecution 
simply because she perceives the sanction prescribed by the law to be 
                                                                                                                      
34 See, e.g., Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 794 (“The decision to file criminal charges, with the 
awesome consequences it entails, requires consideration of a wide range of factors in addi-
tion to the strength of the Government’s case, in order to determine whether the prosecu-
tion would be in the public interest.”); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 
1965) (“The discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining 
whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters 
of policy wholly apart from any question of probable cause.”). 
35 Professor Schuyler Wallace, in a 1930 article reporting results of a survey of American 
prosecutors on the issue of prosecutorial nullification, identified several motivations for dec-
linations to prosecute meritorious cases, including: (1) “desire to make their actions conform 
to local public opinion”; (2) belief that “enforcement of the particular law in question will 
produce injustice rather than justice”; and (3) “confidence that through . . . reasonable dis-
cretion on their part, better social results will be achieved than through the strict enforce-
ment of the law.” See Wallace, supra note 15, at 358. Professor Wallace concluded that “these 
enforcement officers have been and are substituting their own judgments for that of the 
constitutionally ordained policy-determining body and in so doing have actually been nullify-
ing the law.” Id; see also Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Dis-
cretion, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 14 (1971). 
36 Again, the term “declination” includes a variety of prosecutorial decisions to grant 
leniency, including selecting a lesser offense than is warranted by the evidence. See supra 
notes 18–21 and accompanying text; see also Norman J. Finkel, Capital Felony-Murder, Objec-
tive Indicia, and Community Sentiment, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 819, 845 (1990) (describing as “pro-
secutorial nullification” circumstances when prosecutors “undercharged” by failing to 
bring felony murder charges when the evidence supported them) (citing Hugo Bedau, 
Felony Murder Rape and the Mandatory Death Penalty: A Study in Discretionary Justice, 10 Suf-
folk U. L. Rev. 493 (1976)). 
As a consequence of criminal codes with overlapping statutes, prosecutors often have 
multiple charging options for a single criminal transaction. See infra notes 105–109 and 
accompanying text; see also Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: 
Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 Penn St. L. Rev. 1107, 1117–
18 (2005). 
2011] Prosecutorial Nullification 1253 
too harsh.37 This is particularly likely where the law has diminished or 
eliminated the prosecutor’s discretion to advocate for a particular sen-
tence.38 Likewise, a prosecutor may believe that a law is directed toward 
conduct that should not have been criminalized in the first place. In 
addition, a prosecutor might believe the enforcement of a law to be 
detrimental to broader community or societal interests.39 These ration-
ales have long been the basis for perceived instances of jury nullifica-
tion.40 Likewise, when a prosecutor employs these rationales for declin-
ing to prosecute, despite evidence sufficient to convict, the label 
“prosecutorial nullification” is appropriate.41 
                                                                                                                      
37 For example, during the decade in which New York state imposed capital punish-
ment, a prosecutor in New York declared that he would not seek the death penalty in any 
capital case and refused to seek the death penalty in a high-profile case involving the kill-
ing of police officer. Gail Robinson, The DAs of New York, Gotham Gazette (Mar. 7, 2005), 
http://gothamgazette.com/article/20050307/200/1340; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 796 (1982) (noting that “it would be relevant if prosecutors rarely sought the 
death penalty for accomplice felony murder, for it would tend to indicate that prosecutors, 
who represent society’s interest in punishing crime, consider the death penalty excessive 
for accomplice felony murder”); Finkel, supra note 36, at 842–43 (proposing a statistically 
accurate way to determine the likelihood of prosecutorial nullification of accomplice fel-
ony murder cases). 
38 See, e.g., Bjerk, supra note 21, at 594; Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of 
Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1683 n.3 (1992) 
(“Over the centuries, historians have recounted numerous instances in which judges, juries, 
or prosecutors nullified an oppressive law or evaded its formal strictures to avoid imposing 
disproportionate penalties on individual lawbreakers.”); Kessler & Piehl, supra note 21, at 
274; Mark W. Owens, Note, California’s Three Strikes Law: Desperate Times Require Desperate Meas-
ures—But Will It Work?, 26 Pac. L.J. 881, 908 (1995) (describing prosecutorial nullification in 
the context of the mandatory Three Strikes law). 
39 Simon, supra note 5, at 226 (describing as “nullification,” “the prosecutor’s power to 
decline to enforce legislation when enforcement would not serve the public interest”). 
A popular cable television series, The Wire, depicted a police commander who declared 
that enforcement of drug possession and distribution laws would cease in a defined area of 
Baltimore, Maryland, subject to certain conditions, including that the narcotics distributors 
refrain from violence. The Wire: Amsterdam (HBO television broadcast Oct. 10, 2004), available 
at http://www.hbo.com/the-wire/episodes#/the-wire/episodes/3/29-amsterdam/synopsis. 
html. 
40 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 711–16. Jury acquittals based on such rationales have 
been described as “classical” or “first kind” jury nullification. See, e.g., W. William Hodes, 
Lord Brougham, The Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
1075, 1088–97 (1996) (distinguishing jury nullification of the “first kind” (disagreement 
with the law), “second kind” (disagreement with the application of the law in a particular 
case), and “third kind” (disagreement with neither the law nor the application but acquit-
ting to send a message)). 
41 See Robert M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer’s Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, and 
Attorney Civil Disobedience, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1057, 1071–72 (2005) (“We accept the propriety 
of prosecutorial discretion in the criminal justice system as a check on unfair laws.”). 
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 In a similar vein, a prosecutor, though not necessarily opposed to a 
law or prescribed sanction per se, might determine that the application 
of a law is unwise or unfair. For example, a prosecutor might be per-
suaded against applying a law to a particular defendant, such as when 
she declines to prosecute a vulnerable person living in a high-crime 
part of the city for gun possession. In addition, a prosecutor’s discre-
tion might be influenced by the context in which the law was broken, 
such as with a refusal to prosecute a homeless person for trespassing 
after she was found sleeping in an office building during a severe bliz-
zard. These would be examples of the prosecutor declining a case not 
because of a disagreement with the law, but because of the belief that 
the would-be defendant’s moral (if not legal) justification for violating 
the law should prevent the law’s application in the particular case.42 
Jury nullification often is motivated by jurors’ perceptions of an unfair 
or unwise application of a generally non-controversial law in a specific 
case.43 Similarly, prosecutorial nullification is an appropriate charac-
terization of exercises of discretion based on the prosecutor’s as-
applied concerns about criminal laws.44 
C. What Prosecutorial Nullification Is Not 
 It is also important to articulate what prosecutorial nullification is 
not. Prosecutors often decline prosecution because they do not have 
the evidence they feel is necessary to secure a conviction on a given 
charge, or because a given prosecution, even if likely successful, would 
undermine more important law enforcement interests.45 In addition, a 
                                                                                                                      
42 See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1551. Professor Josh Bowers has termed this 
“normative innocence.” Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Deci-
sion Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1678 (2010) (“A criminal is normatively in-
nocent where his conduct is undeserving of communal condemnation, even if it is con-
trary to law.”). 
43 See, e.g., Hodes, supra note 40, at 1094–95 (describing jury nullification of the “sec-
ond kind,” where the jury disagrees with application of the law in a given case). 
44 See Cassak & Heumann, supra note 24, at 494–95 (“Prosecutors may decline to bring 
charges against someone they know committed the offense for any number of reasons, 
including that the facts of the case warrant lenient treatment. . . . That looks something 
like nullification, although few if anyone call it that.”). Some have argued for a narrower 
definition of prosecutorial nullification. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 42, at 1685 n.137 (dis-
tinguishing “categorical nonenforcement” —which might qualify as nullification—from 
“equitable discretion” —which would not). 
45 See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 349 (distinguishing between prosecutorial declina-
tions for evidence sufficiency or law enforcement reasons and “failures to prosecute (or to 
prosecute for crimes as serious as those actually committed) based, at least, in part, on 
judgments about the gravity of offenses or the character of actors”). 
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prosecutor might decline prosecution in order to avoid incurring un-
due systemic costs, or out of consideration for a victim’s needs or wish-
es. As is discussed below, none of these rationales for declining prose-
cution is properly characterized as prosecutorial nullification.46 
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
 Declinations based on a prosecutor’s genuine assessment of the 
sufficiency of evidence should be excluded from the category of “pro-
secutorial nullification.” Where a prosecutor has substantial concern 
regarding either the quantity or quality of evidence necessary to initiate 
criminal charges or ultimately to secure a conviction, the decision not 
to proceed with a prosecution is not properly deemed to be “nullifica-
tion.”47 Certainly, a prosecutor who believes she would not be able to 
garner proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a constitutionally in-
                                                                                                                      
46 Of course, with any discussion of the prosecutor’s discretion, plea bargaining is the 
elephant in the room. See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice 
Officials, 1976 Duke L.J. 651, 680 (“Charging discretion is sometimes exercised to reflect the 
prosecutor’s belief that the circumstances call for leniency, but its most important use is in 
plea bargaining.”). This is particularly so with regard to prosecutorial nullification. Indeed, 
plea bargaining, which is the method by which the vast majority of criminal cases are dis-
posed, often involves the prosecutor agreeing to a guilty plea to a lesser offense than might 
be proven at trial. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 Ga. L. 
Rev. 407, 409 (2008); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Crim-
inal Justice, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79, 90, 93–94 (2005). Also, a prosecutor may agree to dismiss a 
meritorious charge against a defendant in exchange for a guilty plea to another offense. The 
undercharging or declinations associated with plea bargaining are often motivated by the 
various reasons discussed below and, as such, may or may not represent prosecutorial nullifi-
cation under the definition advanced in this Article. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 
1532–35. 
Regardless, it is clear that the plea bargaining process is fertile ground for low-visibility 
nullification opportunities. See Kessler & Piehl, supra note 21, at 259. 
Virtually all defendants’ cases are settled by plea bargain and therefore are 
never subject explicitly to an application of formal law. Research in sociology 
and criminology suggests that this may enable actors in the system to resolve 
the vast majority of cases according to their own internal social norms rather 
than statutory rules. 
Id. 
47 The quantum of evidence necessary to establish or maintain criminal charges at the 
relevant pretrial stages is probable cause. See Miller, supra note 6, at 83–109. Although there 
are varying standards of “probable cause” employed at different stages of the pretrial process, 
evidence subject to probable cause is subject to a much lower threshold than evidence sub-
ject to the standard of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is necessary for a convic-
tion. See id.; Fairfax, supra note 15, at 720–23. For example, probable cause for purposes of 
the preliminary hearing and grand jury indictment may be established through evidence that 
would be inadmissible at trial, including hearsay evidence. See Costello v. United States, 350 
U.S. 359, 363 (1956). 
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firm investigative action will lead to suppression of key evidence, would 
not be engaging in nullification by declining to prosecute a matter any 
more than would a jury that acquits because the evidence fails to reach 
the constitutionally required threshold. A prosecutor may also be de-
terred from prosecuting a seemingly meritorious case because of con-
cerns about whether a key witness’s testimony (even if true) will be 
deemed credible under cross-examination, or because certain disclosed 
exculpatory evidence may likely give rise to reasonable doubt in the 
minds of jurors. Even where reasonable minds could differ over wheth-
er the evidence available to the prosecutor is, indeed, sufficient to es-
tablish probable cause or to secure a conviction, a prosecutor who con-
cludes, based on her good-faith assessment of the evidence, that the 
evidence is insufficient does not engage in prosecutorial nullification. 
2. Law Enforcement Purposes 
 Also excluded from this definition of prosecutorial nullification 
would be instances when a prosecutor likely could secure a conviction in 
a case but declines to do so for legitimate law enforcement purposes.48 
A prosecutor might decline prosecution to secure the cooperation of a 
potential defendant who refuses to testify or provide information unless 
charges against him are dropped or reduced.49 Although such formal or 
informal immunity deals prevent prosecutors from proceeding against 
individuals who likely would be convicted at trial, they often facilitate 
conviction of more serious offenders or more desirable targets.50 
 Furthermore, as is the case in most American jurisdictions, there 
are not sufficient resources available to the prosecutor’s office to prose-
                                                                                                                      
48 But see, e.g., Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible, 13 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 135, 178–79 n.132 (2004) (expressing concern with “prosecutorial nullifi-
cation” in the torture prosecution context in which “[p]olitically driven prosecutors could 
well decline to prosecute officials who torture members of unpopular political or ethnic 
groups, even when there is clear evidence that the torture may not have been justified”). 
49 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: Criminal Informants and the Ero-
sion of American Justice 49 (2009); Michael S. Ross, Thinking Outside the Box: How the 
Enforcement of Ethical Rules Can Minimize the Dangers of Prosecutorial Leniency and Immunity 
Deals, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 875, 876 (2002); David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Pros-
ecutor’s Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 509, 513 (1999). Such bargains must be disclosed to the 
defendant against whom any such testimony might be used. See Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972). 
50 Or, in some cases, of less serious offenders. See, e.g., Libby Copeland, Kemba Smith’s 
Hard Time, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 2000, at F1. 
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cute every meritorious case.51 Prosecutors often must decide not to 
pursue one matter (or category of matters) in order to have the inves-
tigative or prosecutorial capacity to prosecute other matters deemed to 
be of higher priority.52 For example, assume a prosecution for a rela-
tively minor offense involved resource-intensive trial preparation that 
would compromise an office’s ability to prosecute an organized crime 
ring. The decision to forbear the resource-intensive prosecution in or-
der to prosecute the organized crime case is not properly characterized 
as prosecutorial nullification, assuming the prosecutor is making a ge-
nuine determination that the former prosecution should be declined 
for law enforcement purposes.53 
3. Systemic Costs 
 Distinct from the preservation of law enforcement and prosecuto-
rial resources is the desire to ensure efficient criminal justice and court 
administration.54 Prosecutors are not merely repeat players, but officers 
of the court. Like all government lawyers, prosecutors have an obliga-
tion to facilitate the smooth operation of the justice system.55 If a par-
ticular case, though meritorious, would represent a disproportionate 
burden on the justice system relative to the benefit it provides, a prose-
cutor might decide not to prosecute. For example, if a case would re-
quire months of trial time (and concomitant courthouse resources) but 
would be unlikely to vindicate a significant state interest beyond the 
symbolic victory of a conviction, a prosecutor’s decision not to proceed 
should not be characterized as prosecutorial nullification. This would 
                                                                                                                      
51 In the wake of the recent economic crisis, even prosecutors’ offices have suffered 
significant budget cuts. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Outsourcing Criminal Prosecution? The 
Limits of Criminal Justice Privatization, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 265, 275–76. 
52 See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Ac-
tors, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 411, 418–19 & nn.22–23 (2009) (describing how resource con-
straints have forced prosecutors across the nation to shift or narrow enforcement priorities). 
53 Obviously, there is some slippage here, as a prosecutor could decline to prosecute a 
certain offense that violates a law she does not value (or that is committed against a victim 
against whom she is biased, or is committed by a defendant in favor of whom she is biased) 
in order to preserve resources to prosecute another offense violating a law she does value 
(or that is committed against a victim she does favor, or committed by a defendant she 
does not). Although such a declination might be easily characterized as having been made 
for a “law enforcement purpose,” it is perhaps also an example of prosecutorial nullifica-
tion. See infra 56–57 and accompanying text. 
54 See Miller, supra note 6, at 191. 
55 See, e.g., Joshua I. Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General’s Independence, 21 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1119, 1137–38 (1988) (discussing the duty of government lawyers to help 
preserve court resources). 
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be true even if conviction were all but assured and the prosecution 
would require minimal expenditure of law enforcement resources. 
4. Victim-Related Considerations 
 A prosecutor might decline a meritorious criminal case because 
the potential harm to the victim resulting from the prosecution might 
outweigh the benefit to the victim and society.56 While modern crimi-
nal cases are brought in the name of the state, not the individual vic-
tim,57 a victim’s strong desire to protect her privacy, livelihood, or fam-
ily would certainly weigh prominently in a prosecutor’s decision about 
whether to decline a case. Even where a prosecutor might decline a 
case against the victim’s wishes, but ostensibly for the victim’s good, 
such a declination would not constitute prosecutorial nullification. 
                                                                                                                     
 Similarly, there may be criminal cases that cannot proceed without 
the disclosure of sensitive law enforcement or national security infor-
mation. The importance of protecting such sensitive information may 
strongly influence a prosecutor’s willingness to prosecute these cases. 
Where a prosecutor declines to prosecute a meritorious case in these 
circumstances, his decision is not properly characterized as prosecuto-
rial nullification. 
D. Nullification or Discretion? More Challenging Questions 
 While the previous rationales fall outside of this Article’s definition 
of prosecutorial nullification, the rationales below defy tidy characteri-
zation. 
 
56 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 173–78. For example, perhaps the case can only be 
tried in a way that will reveal evidence that is deeply embarrassing to the alleged victim. Of 
course, certain categories of offenses are incompatible with such considerations. A murder 
victim’s family would be unlikely to persuade a prosecutor with sufficient evidence against 
prosecuting the homicide charge. Furthermore, some offenses, such as domestic violence, 
are often subject to a “zero tolerance” prosecution policy. Even were a victim of domestic 
violence to recant her accusation (as some do), the government will often press forward 
with the charges. See Robert C. Davis et al., Effects of No-Drop Prosecution of Domestic Violence 
upon Conviction Rates, Just. Res. & Pol’y, Fall 2001, at 1, 2. Indeed, some offices have tak-
en to prosecuting the domestic violence victims for perjury and obstruction of justice 
when they give contradictory, exculpatory testimony at the trial of their alleged abuser 
(with whom they have reconciled by the time of trial). See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a 
Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence Cases, 39 N.M. L. Rev. 149, 183–84 (2009). 
57 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 52, at 433. 
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1. Alternative (Non-Criminal) Sanctions 
 A prosecutor might decline a meritorious prosecution because 
other remedies are available to vindicate the state’s interest in justice.58 
In a case in which civil or administrative sanctions are sufficient to pun-
ish and deter illegal conduct, the prosecutor might decide that no 
criminal charges need be brought.59 There is a reasonable argument 
that this exercise of prosecutorial discretion should be characterized as 
prosecutorial nullification. After all, the prosecutor here is usurping 
the legislature, which has proscribed certain conduct and prescribed a 
criminal sanction for that conduct. This sanction should arguably be 
imposed regardless of other consequences the defendant might suf-
fer.60 On the other hand, the presence in the law of both civil and crim-
inal sanctions covering the same conduct may be viewed as empower-
ing government attorneys to decide upon the optimal way—whether 
through criminal or civil action—to vindicate the state’s interest in de-
terring or punishing undesirable conduct.61 
 Alternatively, a prosecutor might decline prosecution because the 
putative defendant has already suffered enough. Perhaps the defendant 
has already been subjected to an embarrassing arrest or served a leng-
thy pretrial detention while awaiting formal charges. For some offenses 
and some defendants, the notoriety of the defendant’s arrest or loss of 
liberty might be deemed by the prosecutor as having served sufficient 
                                                                                                                      
58 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 213–52. 
59 Here, I do not necessarily contemplate formal deferred prosecution agreements or 
“probation before judgment” arrangements, as these mechanisms may be implemented 
through statute or promulgated as official prosecutorial policies pursuant to legislative 
command. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (2006) (permitting pre-judgment probation at 
judge’s discretion in low-level drug possession cases); Wis. Stat. § 938.245 (2009–10) 
(permitting deferred prosecution in juvenile cases); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Remaking 
the Grand Jury, in Grand Jury 2.0: Modern Perspectives on the Grand Jury 323, 336–39 
(Roger A. Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2010) [hereinafter Grand Jury 2.0] (describing criminal de-
ferred prosecution agreements, criminal alternative dispute resolution, and drug courts). 
60 Along with whatever sanction might be imposed theoretically would come the 
community’s “condemnation” of the person’s commission of a criminal wrong. Kent 
Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1282, 1282–83 ( Joshua 
Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). 
61 Of course, the government can—and often does—pursue both civil and criminal ac-
tions against a defendant. It should be noted that this discussion addresses only governmen-
tal civil enforcement and does not contemplate the existence of private tort claims as a 
rationale for prosecution declination. See, e.g., L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction 
and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 64, 83 (1948). For example, were a 
prosecutor to decline a meritorious murder prosecution because the victim’s family had 
the ability to pursue a wrongful death case, this would clearly represent an instance of 
prosecutorial nullification. 
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retribution or deterrence purposes. In addition, the circumstances or 
consequences of the offense itself may have already caused extraordi-
nary harm to the offender.62 Such rationales for prosecutorial declina-
tion, even if characterized as prosecutorial nullification, demonstrate 
how the concept of prosecutorial nullification is much more nuanced 
than might be appreciated at first glance. 
2. Desuetude 
 Some criminal laws remain on the statute books but are not en-
forced because they no longer comport with modern societal values.63 
Prosecutors’ refusals to prosecute conduct violating a statute that has 
fallen into desuetude have been properly characterized as prosecutorial 
nullification.64 Scholars have discussed the extent to which legislatures 
have shirked the duty to periodically review existing criminal laws in 
order to ensure they are compatible with contemporary values.65 Some 
might argue that by declining to enforce statutes that are no longer in 
tune with popular sentiment, prosecutors are giving legislatures a pass. 
Indeed, legislators have little incentive to repeal unwise or outdated 
laws if prosecutors do not expose such shortcomings by enforcing those 
statutes.66 On the other hand, from the legislature’s perspective, we 
                                                                                                                      
 
62 Take, for instance, a prosecutor who declines to pursue a case against a harried par-
ent who absent-mindedly left his child strapped in the car seat in a closed vehicle on a hot 
day. That prosecutor is not declining because she disagrees with the criminalization of 
manslaughter or depraved heart murder, or because she thinks that there was moral justi-
fication for the father to have committed the offense. The prosecutor is likely declining 
prosecution because when a parent, even through criminal negligence or extreme reck-
lessness, unintentionally causes the death of a child, there is no punishment greater than 
the emotional and psychological consequences already being suffered by the would-be 
defendant. See Bowers, supra note 42, at 1682. 
63 See Linda Rodgers & William Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 5 
(1966); Note, Desuetude, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2209, 2209–10 nn.4 & 6 (2006) (noting a collec-
tion of sources exploring the doctrine of “desuetude”). 
64 See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice 84 (1998) (“Prosecutorial 
nullification is widely considered legitimate in circumstances where the application of a 
statute produces an especially harsh or anomalous result or where an entire statute, usually 
an old one, seems out of tune with contemporary sentiment—for example, the laws 
against fornication.”); Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 
223, 261 (2007) (noting that “most obscure or superfluous statutes in criminal codes are 
effectively nullified by prosecutors”). 
65 See, e.g., Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law 
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1327, 1354 (2008); Brown, supra note 
64, at 261. 
66 See, e.g., Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 Iowa 
L. Rev. 389, 390 (1963); Myers, supra note 65, at 1354 (discussing that prosecutors’ decli-
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have the classic chicken-and-egg problem; a statute falls out of use only 
because prosecutors and other law enforcers fail to enforce it. 
 Nevertheless, even where the prosecutor refuses to prosecute de-
fendants who have violated laws that have fallen into desuetude, it is still 
the case that the prosecutor is refusing to enforce a valid criminal stat-
ute. As with a prosecutor who declines a case because of her disagree-
ment with the wisdom of a law or its application in a particular case, a 
prosecutor who declines to prosecute a meritorious case under a statute 
that has fallen into desuetude, engages in prosecutorial nullification.67 
3. Hybrid Rationales 
 Another conceptual difficulty lies in the reality that the many ra-
tionales for prosecutorial decisions not to prosecute do not operate in 
isolation from one another. A prosecutor might decide against prosecu-
tion of a meritorious case both because law enforcement interests 
would be disserved by prosecution and because the prosecution would 
impose tremendous costs on the system. This hybrid rationale would 
not fall under the definition of prosecutorial nullification advanced in 
this Article. Likewise, a prosecutor might decline to prosecute a merito-
rious case both because she worries about the impact of prosecution on 
the defendant’s family and because she disagrees that the conduct 
should be criminalized in the first place. This hybrid rationale would 
fall easily within this Article’s definition of prosecutorial nullification. 
  Hybrid rationales, however, might also straddle the definitional 
line dividing prosecutorial nullification from prosecutorial discretion. 
For example, a prosecutor might decline prosecution both because he 
has sympathy for a defendant and because he rationally prefers to util-
ize limited prosecutorial resources for more serious offenses. Certainly, 
the presence of a nullificatory rationale (even when accompanied by a 
genuine, non-nullificatory reason) would seem to support the charac-
terization of the declination as prosecutorial nullification. In such cas-
es, the non-nullificatory reason for declining prosecution may, however, 
                                                                                                                      
nation to enforce statutes because of desuetude removes incentives of legislatures to re-
move bad laws) (quoting Brown, supra note 64, at 261). 
67 As discussed above, the characterization that the prosecutor is engaging in nullifica-
tion does not mean that the outcome of such nullification is normatively undesirable. See 
supra 36–44 and accompanying text. Whether we are comfortable with nullification with 
regard to the rule of law, however, is an entirely different question. See discussion infra 
notes 70–120. 
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serve as an effective pretext for shielding the exercise of discretion 
from claims that it constitutes prosecutorial nullification.68 
 Concededly, there are nuances that make a satisfactory, compre-
hensive definition of prosecutorial nullification difficult. Furthermore, 
differing views of the scope of the prosecutorial role, including whether 
they fall closer to the full enforcement model or the complete discre-
tion model, will dictate other approaches. For the aforementioned rea-
sons, this paper assumes that prosecutorial nullification occurs when a 
prosecutor, because of her personal views regarding the wisdom of a 
law or of the desirability of punishing a culpable wrongdoer, declines to 
prosecute a defendant against whom she has sufficient evidence to 
convict without frustrating law enforcement purposes or undermining 
the other important interests outlined above—including the interests 
of victims and efficient criminal justice administration. 
 As the foregoing demonstrates, much of what commentators have 
referred to as “prosecutorial nullification” is simply garden-variety pro-
secutorial discretion. Conversely, what many term as “prosecutorial dis-
cretion” is better characterized as “prosecutorial nullification.” Perhaps 
labels are unimportant anyway; most of the courts and commentators 
that have considered what is properly understood as “prosecutorial nul-
lification” have implicitly endorsed—or at least have not condemned— 
the practice.69 But should prosecutorial nullification be accepted by 
our legal culture? Even were we to assume that an instance of prosecu-
torial nullification does not violate any formal legal limits placed on 
prosecutorial discretion (i.e., contravene any statutory command of full 
enforcement or constitutional or statutory prohibitions against corrup-
tion or bias in prosecutorial decision-making), does it still violate the 
rule of law? The next Part explores this question. 
                                                                                                                      
68 It should also be acknowledged that a prosecutor might decline to prosecute a meri-
torious case for a reason related to corruption or bias. For example, a corrupt prosecutor 
might decline to prosecute in exchange for a bribe, or because there is some material pro-
fessional benefit to be derived from showing favor to an influential person. Likewise, a 
prosecutor might decline to prosecute a defendant because he is of a favored racial or 
religious group, or out of prejudice against a disfavored one. Decisions grounded in such 
improper motivations may or may not be examples of prosecutorial nullification but, in 
any event, violate constitutional and ethical rules governing the work of public prosecu-
tors. See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463; Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456. 
69 See, e.g., Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1213 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“Prosecutors can, 
and often do, make [charging] decisions based on their judgments as to how wise and im-
portant certain laws may be.”) (citing William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505, 599 (2001) (“[P]rosecutors have the discretion not to enforce 
when the laws are too harsh.”)). 
2011] Prosecutorial Nullification 1263 
II. Does Prosecutorial Nullification Have a Special  
Claim to Legitimacy? 
 This Part examines the legitimacy of prosecutorial nullification.70 
Section A begins exploring whether prosecutorial nullification is con-
sistent with the rule of law.71 Section B then uses several analytical 
touchstones to further examine the legitimacy of prosecutors engaging 
in nullification.72 
A. Prosecutorial Nullification and the Rule of Law 
 Prosecutorial nullification seems to provoke far less outcry than 
jury nullification.73 Many who would condemn, but grudgingly accept, 
a petit jury’s acquittal of a sympathetic, but obviously guilty, defendant 
would barely raise an eyebrow were they aware of a prosecutor declin-
ing to indict that same defendant in the first instance for the same rea-
sons of sympathy motivating the jury. As Professor Darryl Brown ob-
serves: 
We fully accept that prosecutors have discretion to apply crim-
inal law or not according to their own judgment, into which 
they are readily allowed to consider moral or social policy fac-
tors well beyond the facts’ relation to the statutory elements. 
Rare is the contention that prosecutorial discretion is “law-
less,” as opposed to merely ill-advised. Yet a jury making essen-
tially the same judgment—thus double-checking the prosecu-
tor’s choice by deciding whether it finds compelling reasons 
to nullify rather than endorse the prosecutor’s application of 
law—faces the traditional objections of bias, irrationality, or 
subversion of the democratic process.74 
                                                                                                                      
70 See infra notes 73–120 and accompanying text. 
71 See infra notes 73–88 and accompanying text. 
72 See infra notes 89–120 and accompanying text. 
73 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1354 (2008). As the author has observed elsewhere, “the term 
‘jury nullification’ carries significant baggage.” Fairfax, supra note 15, at 717; see also Ro-
bert C. Black, FIJA: Monkeywrenching the Justice System?, 66 UMKC L. Rev. 11, 32–33 (1997) 
(arguing that use of the term “jury discretion” rather than “jury nullification” is more con-
sistent with how the discretion of other criminal justice actors is characterized). For the 
reasons stated above, however, “prosecutorial nullification” does not seem to carry the 
same level of stigma, and can be a useful distinguishing characterization for the consid-
ered analysis of the scope and role of prosecutorial discretion. 
74 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 22, at 1189–90. 
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 The perceived ubiquity and acceptance of prosecutorial nullifica-
tion are often cited by defenders of the jury’s prerogative to nullify.75 
Indeed, the analogy between prosecutorial nullification and jury nullifi-
cation is difficult to resist. With jury nullification, the jury declines to 
convict despite conclusive evidence establishing the defendant’s guilt. 
With prosecutorial nullification, a prosecutor declines to prosecute de-
spite having sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction of the defendant. 
The jury’s decision to acquit a culpable defendant spares that individual 
the societal and moral condemnation of a criminal conviction. In the 
same way, a prosecutor’s forbearance allows a wrongdoer to avoid the 
stigma of a criminal conviction (and perhaps even formal allegation). 
 Many critics of jury nullification frame the issue as one of “power” 
vs. “right.”76 Under this theory, juries have the power to nullify because 
our constitutional constraints preclude our revisiting their acquittals.77 
This does not mean, however, that juries have the right to nullify.78 Such 
exercises of jury nullification, according to critics, are illegitimate depar-
tures from legal rules and should be discouraged through any means, 
including aggressive voir dire and anti-nullification jury instructions.79 
Although juries, like most actors in the criminal justice process, have the 
power to exercise discretion, prosecutors may be seen as having a much 
greater claim to legitimacy when exercising discretionary power.80 But 
what is the source of the perceived legitimacy of prosecutorial nullifica-
tion? 
 In other words, even if a consensus can be achieved as to the defi-
nition of “prosecutorial nullification,” the question remains whether 
the practice is consistent with the rule of law. Mortimer and Sanford 
Kadish explain that “the rule-of-law model requires those who exercise 
government authority to conform strictly to the rules.”81 When a prose-
cutor declines to prosecute a defendant or charge a certain crime for 
reasons apart from evidentiary sufficiency or law enforcement purposes 
(even if she does so in a non-corrupt and non-discriminatory way), has 
she strayed from the rule of law? 
                                                                                                                      
75 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 17, at 245–47. 
76 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 15, at 723–26; cf. also Howe, supra note 22, at 588–89. 
77 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 15, at 724–25. 
78 See, e.g., id. at 724; Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance, Morally Reasonable Verdicts, 
and Jury Nullification, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 467, 503 (2001). 
79 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 15, at 724; Pettys, supra note 78, at 503. 
80 See Simon, supra note 5, at 226. 
81 Kadish & Kadish, supra note 2, at 41. 
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 This question is important, in part, because the enforcement of 
the criminal law is entrusted fully to the prosecutor’s office, and thus 
prosecutors who engage in nullification can effectively make a law in-
operative in a jurisdiction.82 Austin Sarat and Conor Clarke have theo-
rized the connection between sovereign power and the prosecutor’s 
ability to decline prosecution despite a reasonable evidentiary basis on 
which to proceed.83 Sarat and Clarke view circumstances in which pros-
ecutors could legitimately prosecute an individual but decline to do so, 
as examples of “lawful lawlessness,”84 which they define as “actions that 
are legally authorized, but not legally regulated”85 and “instances in 
which law acknowledges its own limits and confers a kind of sovereign 
prerogative on a legal official.”86 In their view, prosecutors’ ability to 
decide to excuse individuals from the prohibitions of criminal law 
represents a “fragment of sovereignty.”87 Professor Vorenberg observes 
that “a prosecutor who habitually dispenses leniency is arrogating to 
himself a powerful weapon that he may use at his pleasure.”88 Cast in 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Wallace, supra note 15, at 348 (describing results of a survey of 3000 prosecutors 
across the United States, many of whom “boldly admit[ted] that they nullify both laws and 
ordinances whenever and wherever it seems desirable”); see also Nat’l Comm’n on Law 
Observance & Enforcement, Report on Prosecution 19 (1931) (describing the mod-
ern prosecutor as “the real arbiter of what laws shall be enforced and against whom”); 
Fairfax, supra note 15, at 735–36 n.175 (discussing how “prosecutors may ‘nullify’ a crimi-
nal statute by refusing to enforce it”) (citing Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal 
Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 389 (1964)); Joshua L. Shapiro, And Unusual: 
Examining the Forgotten Prong of the Eighth Amendment, 38 U. Mem. L. Rev. 465, 483 n.66 
(2008) (“For example, if a formal law is not enforced and indeed is disregarded by prose-
cutors or nullified by juries, perhaps that formal law is not really the ‘law.’”). 
83 Austin Sarat & Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and 
the Limits of Law, 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 387, 390 (2008). 
84 Id.; see also Stuntz, supra note 69, at 597. 
85 Sarat & Clarke, supra note 83, at 390. 
86 Id.; see also Arthur Rosett, Discretion, Severity, and Legality in Criminal Justice, 46 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 12, 15 (1972) (“Discretion usually is seen as normlessness . . . .”). William Simon, in 
his influential essay, however, notes that prosecutorial nullification and other types of nulli-
fication, “are never defended as forms of lawlessness, but rather as decentralizations of law 
application.” Simon, supra note 5, at 226. 
87 Sarat & Clarke, supra note 83, at 390. 
88 Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1552; see also State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 166 
N.W.2d 255, 260 (Wis. 1969). 
There is no obligation or duty upon a district attorney to prosecute all com-
plaints that may be filed with him. While it is his duty to prosecute criminals, 
it is obvious that a great portion of the power of the state has been placed in 
his hands for him to use in the furtherance of justice, and this does not per se 
require prosecution in all cases where there appears to be a violation of the 
law no matter how trivial. 
Kurkierewicz, 166 N.W.2d at 260. 
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these terms, the question whether prosecutorial nullification is consis-
tent with the rule of law clearly deserves greater scrutiny. Below are sev-
eral analytical touchstones utilized to explore the case for prosecutorial 
nullification within the rule of law. 
B. Analytical Touchstones 
1. The Prosecutorial Role 
 The unique nature of the prosecutorial function may serve as a 
source of legitimacy for prosecutorial nullification. The conventional 
analogy between jury nullification and prosecutorial nullification ne-
glects to account for the distinct roles played by each of the two actors 
in our system of criminal justice. The dominant view is that the jury’s 
role is simply to determine whether the government has presented 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt,89 whereas the prosecutor’s role con-
templates some degree of discretion.90 Prosecutors are charged with 
determining whether the public interest is served by a prosecution and 
how a prosecution fits into a broader enforcement scheme, among 
other considerations. Juries, on the other hand, are charged simply 
with deciding whether they have been presented with sufficient proof 
that the defendant has committed the charged offense.91 
                                                                                                                      
 
89 See, e.g., Pettys, supra note 78, at 503. 
90 Cf. Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the 
Federal Grand Jury, 94 Geo. L.J. 1265, 1269 (2006). Additionally, there was a shift from a 
system of largely private prosecution, where victims would bring their complaints directly 
to the grand jury for approval to bring a criminal action against a defendant, to the mod-
ern public prosecution model, where a public lawyer represents the interests of the state. 
See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 52, at 421–24. Perhaps inherent in this modern role is the au-
thority to exercise discretion on bases beyond sufficiency of the evidence. 
91 The same might be said of the prosecutor’s role relative to that of law enforcement 
officers. Law enforcement officers generally enjoy a great deal of discretion; as with prose-
cutors, it would be impractical for law enforcement personnel to address every criminal 
violation they might encounter. See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, Amer-
ican Criminal Procedure: Cases and Commentary 860 (9th ed. 2010); Goldstein, supra 
note 17, at 560–61. In addition, police choose whether to arrest based on predictions of 
which cases the prosecutor might decline to prosecute or the court might dismiss, among 
other considerations. See, e.g., Saltzburg & Capra, supra, at 861; Goldstein, supra note 17, 
at 575 n.67. 
Nevertheless, there is a greater expectation, for instance, that a police officer will con-
fine considerations informing her decision to arrest for a serious offense to whether she 
has probable cause. See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 356–57 (“Police are not hired to 
decide what crimes are more serious than others, and they must usually act on the spur of 
the moment; their warrant to sift among the moral claims of various violators is much 
weaker than that of prosecutors.”); Bowers, supra note 42, at 1702; Vorenberg, supra note 
46, at 653. A prosecutor, on the other hand, normally would be given greater latitude, 
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 Even if one believes the jury should play a more robust discretion-
ary role, petit jurors do not have access to the sort of information prose-
cutors use to make many of their declination decisions.92 Petit jurors are 
shielded from just the sort of information that a prosecutor might use in 
determining whether to nullify—the defendant’s history, level of re-
morse, and propensity to commit other bad acts, as well as how the de-
fendant’s case compares to others in the jurisdiction.93 Furthermore, by 
the time petit jurors are engaged in a matter, tremendous resources 
likely have been expended in bringing the case to trial. Unlike with 
prosecutorial nullification, such resources are wasted when a petit jury 
“nullifies” a criminal case for reasons unrelated to the evidence.94 
 Thus, perhaps the role assigned to the prosecutor in the modern 
criminal justice system makes it such that what this Article characterizes 
as prosecutorial nullification is not ultra vires. In other words, it may be 
the case that the role played by the public prosecutor makes prosecuto-
rial nullification simply a part of the prosecutor’s “job description.”95 
The established ability to exercise unreviewable discretion,96 along with 
                                                                                                                      
 
particularly with less serious offenses. See Bowers, supra note 42, at 1703–05; George C. 
Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mundane, 109 Penn. St. 
L. Rev. 1043, 1052–53 (2005); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1551–52. 
For example, if law enforcement officers were to respond to an alarm at a residence 
and discover a burglary in process, the reasonable expectation would be that the alleged 
perpetrator would be arrested. Even though the responding officers theoretically (in the 
absence of a compulsory arrest statute or policy) could decide not to arrest the suspect, it 
would seem to be an unreasonable exercise of enforcement discretion to do so—even if 
the defendant was sympathetic or the burglary statute carried a draconian penalty the 
officers thought to be unfair. See Goldstein, supra note 17, at 557–58 & n.27 (noting that 
full enforcement mandates generally appear in statutes, municipal charters, ordinances, or 
police manuals). If after the burglary arrest, the prosecutor subsequently declined to pros-
ecute a meritorious case against the burglary suspect for the same reasons of sympathy or 
penalty avoidance, such a decision (to the understandable dismay of the victimized home-
owner) would be viewed as more legitimate than the police officers’ decision not to arrest 
the perpetrator at the scene. This, as with the discussion of the petit jury above, is related 
to the role assigned—by law and legal culture—to prosecutors vis-à-vis other criminal jus-
tice actors. 
92 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 15, at 746–47. 
93 However, as some have noted, heavy caseloads may prevent prosecutors from realizing 
such advantages. See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How 
Excessive Prosecutor Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 261, 264 (2011). 
94 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 756–57. 
95 But see Bowers, supra note 42, at 1688–1703; Vorenberg, supra note 6, 1557–59 (point-
ing out that the prosecutor’s adversarial and political roles may undermine the ability to 
exercise discretion properly, and casting doubt on the notion that the “background, training, 
self-selection, or general outlook of prosecutors” makes them better equipped than other 
actors to wield discretion). 
96 Rachel E. Barkow, Mercy’s Decline and Administrative Law’s Ascendance, in Criminal 
Law Conversations 663, 682 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (“[A]lthough juries can 
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the other features of the modern prosecutorial role discussed below, 
helps to bolster prosecutorial nullification’s claim to legitimacy. 
2. Democratic Accountability 
 Another basis for the legitimacy of prosecutorial nullification 
might be the prosecutor’s democratic accountability.97 
 Most chief prosecutors in the United States are elected, usually at 
the local level.98 Even those who are appointed often serve at the pleas-
ure of a public official who is directly elected and accountable to the 
people.99 The notion that the prosecutor represents the interests of, 
and is accountable to, the citizenry in the enforcement of the criminal 
law ( just as the legislature represents the interests of the citizenry in the 
development of the criminal law) is a powerful argument for the au-
thority of prosecutors to engage in “nullification.”100 
                                                                                                                      
 
convict as well as acquit, their decisions to convict are reviewable. . . . Prosecutors, in con-
trast, possess both the unreviewable power to be merciful and the unreviewable power to 
impose punishment.”). 
There are, of course, potential checks on the prosecutor’s decisions to charge, in the 
form of grand jury indictment, judicial probable cause determinations, and jury and judi-
cial reasonable doubt findings at trial. But see, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Prosecutorial Charg-
ing Practices and Grand Jury Screening: Some Empirical Observations, in Grand Jury 2.0, supra 
note 59, at 195, 214 (concluding that “it is hard to find support . . . for a claim that grand 
juries currently serve as a meaningful check on prosecutorial charging decisions”). Never-
theless, with the ubiquity of plea bargaining, which necessarily involves the defendant’s 
waiver of important checks on prosecutorial charging decisions, and the modern sentenc-
ing regime, in which the prosecutor’s charging decision often drives the punishment, such 
safeguards are illusory. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 
58 Stan. L. Rev. 989, 1044–47 (2006). 
97 As Professors Ronald Wright and Marc Miller recently stated: 
The need for accountable criminal prosecutors runs deep. Prosecutors en-
force the most serious moral commitments of a society, and control the most 
serious punishments that a government can impose, short of waging war. In 
democratic governments committed to the rule of law, the prosecutor must 
exercise this power responsibly and be able to demonstrate that fact to the 
public. A responsible exercise of power means judgments that are consistent 
with current public preferences and with fundamental, long-term legal prin-
ciples. In short, the prosecutor must be accountable both to the people and 
to their laws. 
Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1587, 1589 (2010). 
98 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Pros-
ecutor 10–11 (2007); see also Wright & Miller, supra note 97, at 1604–05. 
99 See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the 
States, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 519, 540 (2011); Wright & Miller, supra note 97, at 1604. 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Cannon, 166 N.W.2d at 260 (noting that although a prosecutor “is not answerable to any 
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 As some scholars have argued, however, the democratic account-
ability of prosecutors—even those who are directly elected—is fairly 
weak given the failure of the electoral process to highlight prosecutorial 
policies for voter consideration.101 Prosecutorial re-election rates are 
high and the vast majority of incumbents go unchallenged.102 Further-
more, even if such prosecutorial accountability was pursued through the 
electoral process, it would be impossible to achieve without a certain 
level of transparency. Yet, because prosecutorial decision making is 
largely hidden from public view,103 the voters are only able to obtain as 
much information about the practice of nullification as prosecutors are 
willing to share. Nevertheless, there is at least the potential for achieving 
a level of accountability that may enhance our comfort with prosecutors 
engaging in prosecutorial nullification.104 
                                                                                                                      
other officer of the state in respect to the manner in which he exercises [prosecutorial 
discretion], . . . he is answerable to the people, for if he fails in his trust he can be recalled 
or defeated at the polls”). As Professors Wright and Miller note, most prosecutors are 
elected locally, in geographically compact areas. See Wright & Miller, supra note 97, at 1606 
(“The local prosecutor remains close to the community, where democratic accountability is 
thought to be strongest.”); see also Barkow, supra note 99, at 537. 
101 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 98, at 163–66; Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation 
Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. Pa. L Rev. 959, 961 (2009); Russell M. Gold, Pro-
moting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 Wash. L. Rev. 69, 78–79 (2011); Sanford C. Gordon & 
Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 Am. 
J. Pol. Sci. 334, 336 (2002); Daniel C. Richman, Old Chief v. United States: Stipulating 
Away Prosecutorial Accountability?, 83 Va. L. Rev. 939, 963 (1997); Ronald F. Wright, How 
Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 583 (2009); Gerard A. Rainville, Dif-
fering Incentives of Appointed and Elected Prosecutors and the Relationship Between 
Prosecutor Policy and Votes in Local Elections 6 (Dec. 3, 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, American University) (on file with author). 
102 See Wright & Miller, supra note 97, at 1606. 
103 See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 393, 443, 448 (2001); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The 
Black Box, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 125, 129 (2008). Prosecution declinations for non-evidentiary or 
law enforcement reasons are low-visibility relative to jury nullification. See, e.g., Barkow, 
supra note 73, at 1353–54. 
104 See Wright & Miller, supra note 97, at 1600 (“Ultimately, an accountable prosecutor 
does more than prevent misconduct: Accountability creates faith and trust in the workings 
of prosecutors, courts, and government more generally.”). Perhaps this is the same level of 
comfort we have with the executive pardon power and clemency, which are also exercised 
by elected officials (or their designees) who are accountable to the voters. See, e.g., Fairfax, 
supra note 15, at 740–41; Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 1169, 1172–73 (2010); Roscoe Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and 
Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special Case, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 925, 935 (1960). 
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3. Delegation/Expertise 
 Another potential basis for the legitimacy of prosecutorial nullifi-
cation may be found in the idea that the legislature has implicitly dele-
gated to prosecutors the authority not only to enforce the law, but also 
to decide whether to enforce the law.105 After all, most criminal statutes 
carry no explicit, affirmative mandate of full enforcement. Further-
more, legislatures in recent decades have been accused of “overcrimi-
nalization” —passing an excessive number of often redundant and 
overlapping criminal statutes.106 Perhaps implicit in this is a delegation 
of authority to prosecutors to determine which, if any, of these laws are 
to be enforced. As Professor William Stuntz observed: 
As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication 
pass into the hands of police and prosecutors; law enforcers, 
not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long. 
The end point of the progression is clear: criminal codes that 
cover everything and decide nothing, that serve only to dele-
gate power to district attorneys’ offices and police depart-
ments.107 
 Related to this theory of delegation is the idea that prosecutorial 
nullification may be perceived as more legitimate than other forms of 
nullification because prosecutors have expertise akin to administrative 
agencies. As Professor Barkow has argued, “[j]ust as agencies escape 
oversight when they refuse to act—because they are balancing resource 
constraints and other considerations—prosecutors avoid scrutiny be-
cause they are viewed as making a professional determination based on 
their expertise in prioritizing cases.”108 Barkow hypothesizes that the 
administrative nature of the prosecutorial function is the reason that 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 349 (describing “an implicit delegated discretion 
to decide whether to go forward”). But see Vorenberg, supra note 46, at 680 (arguing that 
power of the prosecutor to disregard the coverage of criminal statutes derives from “de-
fault rather than a conscious legislative judgment”). 
106 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mat-
tress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 747, 753–56 (2005); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., 
From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime” Policies: American Criminal Justice Reform—
Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y (forthcoming 2011); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcrimi-
nalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 541, 542 (2005); Vorenberg, supra note 6, 
at 1548 (1981). 
107 Stuntz, supra note 69, at 509. 
108 Barkow, supra note 73, at 1354. 
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“prosecutorial discretion is viewed with less suspicion than the other 
mechanisms of mercy” in the criminal law.109 
4. Institutional Checks 
 Institutional pressures also bear upon prosecutors and may serve 
to constrain prosecutors in their exercise of prosecutorial nullification. 
One such institutional check comes from the police agencies.110 Even 
though prosecutorial decisions are often hidden from public view, 
those law enforcement officials involved in the investigation of crime 
and apprehension of suspects may become aware—and may protest— 
when prosecutors nullify. 
 The judiciary provides another institutional check on prosecutors. 
Although many early-stage prosecutorial declinations occur before 
formal court proceedings take place, some undoubtedly happen after 
the judiciary becomes involved—after an arrest or search warrant is 
obtained, a preliminary examination or detention hearing held, or 
even after an indictment or other charging document is filed. Where a 
prosecutor must obtain leave of court to nolle pros or dismiss a case, or 
otherwise have to answer to the court regarding her decision not to 
pursue charges in a given case,111 this judicial scrutiny may serve as a 
constraint on her power to nullify.112 
 In addition, as mentioned above, there is an internal institutional 
check present in most prosecutors’ offices. This internal check is repre-
sented by the norms which develop among a group of prosecutors 
working together on numerous cases over a period of time.113 As Pro-
fessors Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have observed, prosecutors 
benefit from the development of norms that help guide their exercises 
of discretion—including the consideration of whether to engage in 
                                                                                                                      
109 Id. 
110 See Bowers, supra note 42, at 1700–03. 
111 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). Even where the court has no ability to compel the prose-
cution, it may, of course, inquire informally of the prosecutor regarding the reasons for 
the decision to not proceed. 
112 But see Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
113 See, e.g., Joan E. Jacoby, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Prosecutor’s Charging De-
cision: A Policy Perspective 15–16 (1976); Lawton P. Cummings, Can an Ethical Person 
Be an Ethical Prosecutor? A Social Cognitive Approach to Systemic Reform, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 
2139, 2147–49 (2010); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1543; Kay Levine & Ronald Wright, Be-
coming a Prosecutor: How Prosecutors Grow into Their Professional Roles 9 (2011) (draft 
manuscript, on file with author). 
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prosecutorial nullification.114 Consequently, individual prosecutors in 
an office setting are required to answer not only to their supervisors, 
but may also be held accountable to institutional norms.115 In contrast, 
juries, as one-time players, do not have the benefit of such norms.116 
Juries operate in the context of a single, isolated case. Although jurors 
certainly bring to the task their own notions of justice and mercy, they 
are severely limited in their ability to ascertain how a particular case fits 
into a broader pattern of cases and how a particular outcome compares 
to those for other similarly situated defendants. Juries, therefore, en-
gage in nullification without the broader context and meaning of their 
decisions to acquit against the evidence. 
5. Obligation Constraints on Prosecutorial Discretion 
 In addition, prosecutors have a number of obligations which may 
serve as potential constraints on—and may impact any assessment of the 
legitimacy of—prosecutorial nullification. Of course, when exercising 
their broad discretion, prosecutors operate under obligations imposed 
by applicable constitutional or statutory provisions.117 As discussed 
above, some might argue that prosecutors have an obligation to the leg-
islature, from whom the power to enforce the law was delegated. Also, 
whatever responsibility prosecutors owe to the legislature to enforce 
criminal laws, they certainly have an obligation to the community to 
maintain safety and order. 
 Prosecutors may also have certain moral obligations that may or 
may not correspond with formal legal constraints on the prosecutorial 
function. One may be the obligation of consistency (or non-
arbitrariness) and fairness in the treatment of defendants. Such an ob-
ligation likely cuts against the legitimacy of prosecutorial nullification, 
as the practice necessarily advantages some defendants over others. Al-
though some of these reservations may be addressed in circumstances 
where there is an across-the-board policy of declining to prosecute un-
der a particular statute or in a particular situation, nevertheless, there 
are very real consistency and fairness concerns raised by prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                      
114 See Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, Comments, Subjective and Objective Discretion of 
Prosecutors, in Criminal Law Conversations, supra note 96, at 673, 674. 
115 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 888–93 (2009); Bibas, supra note 101, at 961. 
116 See Wright & Miller, supra note 114, at 674. 
117 See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 
U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution 
and Race: Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 13, 42–46 (1998). 
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nullification.118 Additionally, it is often said that the prosecutor has a 
duty to “seek justice.”119 Inherent in such a duty may be the obligation 
to show “mercy” when the circumstances warrant. Mercy is seen by 
many to be a desirable feature of criminal law administration.120 Prose-
cutorial nullification is a potent vehicle for such mercy. 
III. Normative Considerations and Implications 
 Whether this Article’s characterization of prosecutorial nullifica-
tion is distinct from garden-variety prosecutorial discretion or is consis-
tent with the rule of law, the reality is that prosecutors have the ability 
to engage in it. Prosecutorial nullification has implications for the ad-
ministration of criminal justice. What are the benefits and burdens of 
prosecutorial nullification and what, if anything, can be done to regu-
late it? Section A highlights the benefits and burdens that prosecutorial 
nullification creates for the administration of criminal justice.121 Finally, 
Section B examines potential mechanisms that may be used to properly 
regulate prosecutorial nullification.122 
A. Benefits and Burdens of Prosecutorial Nullification 
 Prosecutorial nullification may provide important benefits for the 
administration of criminal justice. Some scholars, such as Professor 
                                                                                                                      
118 Professors Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have highlighted the distinction between 
the “objective” and “subjective” accounts of discretion within the administrative state. Un-
der the objective account of discretion, as long as decisions are confined within pre-
determined formal limits, they represent a proper exercise of discretion. On the other 
hand, the subjective account of discretion requires decision-makers to “justify their choices 
based on public-regarding reasons.” Wright and Miller, supra note 114, at 673–74. In the 
latter account of discretion, which might be applied to exercises of prosecutorial decision 
making, Professors Wright and Miller note that discretionary actors emphasize consistency, 
fairness, and equality of treatment. See id. 
119 Am. Bar. Ass’n, American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, 3-
1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) (“The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.”); 
see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting that a prosecutor’s “interest . . . 
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done”). 
120 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1871, 1892 (2000). As 
Professor Paul Robinson observes, however, consideration of “mercy” often fails to account 
for “a rich and nuanced concept [of desert] . . . .” Paul H. Robinson, Mercy, Crime Control and 
Moral Credibility 1–2 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Paper 
No. 10-32, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1685221; 
see Bowers, supra note 42, at 1678–83 (distinguishing “normative innocence” from “mercy”); 
id. at 1678 (“Roughly, normative innocence is equivalent to a lack of blameworthiness, and, 
accordingly, it is a retributive concept.”). 
121 See infra notes 123–131 and accompanying text. 
122 See infra notes 132–155 and accompanying text. 
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Paul Butler, have argued that jury nullification has a role to play in pur-
suing an equitable criminal justice system.123 Perhaps prosecutors simi-
larly use prosecutorial nullification to make their own improvements to 
the quality of justice. Prosecutorial nullification may serve as a much 
needed safety valve for when an otherwise justified prosecution does 
not serve societal needs or the general aims of the criminal law, particu-
larly in an era of overcriminalization.124 Furthermore, if mercy is to play 
an important role in the administration of the criminal law, prosecuto-
rial nullification is a tremendous vehicle for it.125 Prosecutorial nullifi-
cation is more efficient than other mercy mechanism, such as jury nul-
lification, because the case is disposed of before significant resources 
are expended.126 Finally, prosecutorial nullification may provide the 
flexibility to bring criminal enforcement in line with evolving societal 
values, even before the legislature has a chance to do so.127 
 These potential benefits of prosecutorial nullification, however, 
must be balanced against its potential drawbacks. Prosecutorial nullifica-
tion, it must be remembered, frustrates legislative prerogative. By refus-
ing to enforce a statute because he disagrees with it, a prosecutor substi-
tutes his own judgment for that of the legislature. In addition, 
prosecutorial nullification undermines the constitutional value of fair 
notice, as it blurs the picture of which conduct will actually prompt en-
forcement for would-be defendants.128 Furthermore, prosecutorial nul-
lification promotes unfairness and arbitrariness by allowing for the real 
                                                                                                                      
123 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 22, at 679; see also Weinstein, supra note 17, at 240. 
124 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice, 90 N.C. L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 2011–2012). 
125 See Linda R. Meyer, The Justice of Mercy 102 (2010); supra notes 117–120. Addi-
tionally, perhaps some of the equality concerns associated with the practice of mercy in the 
criminal process might be better assuaged at the charging rather than the sentencing 
stage. For a discussion of how mercy in criminal law administration might burden equality, 
see generally Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421 (2004). 
126 See Fairfax, supra note 15, at 756–57. 
127 See supra 48–53. But see Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 Ca-
lif. L. Rev. 323, 361 (2004) (“There is less fear that enforcers will depart from the prefer-
ences of the legislature, because both groups benefit from the public perception of strin-
gent enforcement policies.”). 
128 See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New Words, 
Old Wounds?, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099, 2117–18 (1989) (arguing that “jury nullification” and 
“prosecutorial discretion” undermine fair notice and equality of treatment for criminal 
defendants); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1550. But cf. Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, 
Strategic Enforcement, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 9, 30 (2010); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1549–50 
(1981); Vorenberg, supra note 46, at 664. 
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possibility that similarly situated defendants will be treated differently.129 
As Professor Vorenberg observes: 
Giving prosecutors the power to invoke or deny punishment 
at their discretion raises the prospect that society’s most fun-
damental sanctions will be imposed arbitrarily and capri-
ciously and that the least favored members of the commu-
nity—racial and ethnic minorities, social outcasts, the poor— 
will be treated most harshly.130 
Finally, as has been discussed above, prosecutorial nullification helps to 
conceal deficiencies in criminal justice and obscures legislators’ re-
sponsibility for making important policy judgments.131 Therefore, it is 
important to consider whether and how prosecutors’ ability to engage 
in nullification can be constrained in any meaningful way. 
B. Mechanisms to Regulate Prosecutorial Nullification 
1. External Pressures 
 Regulation of prosecutorial nullification, as with prosecutorial dis-
cretion more generally, is difficult because there is often no standee to 
raise concerns over the failure to prosecute, particularly in “victimless” 
crimes. As mentioned above, law enforcement may serve as a check on 
a prosecutor’s decision to nullify. 132 Law enforcement officers are of-
ten invested in cases and remain vigilant to ensure that matters proceed 
to conviction. They are able to exert institutional pressure on prosecu-
tors who might otherwise be inclined to decline prosecution in a given 
case. Theoretically, the grand jury could step in and attempt to prompt 
                                                                                                                      
129 See Markel, supra note 125, at 1476; Massaro, supra note 128, at 2117–18; cf. Lonnie 
T. Brown, Jr., A Tale of Prosecutorial Indiscretion: Ramsey Clark and the Selective Non-Prosecution 
of Stokely Carmichael, 62 S.C. L. Rev. 1, 34 (2011). Also, prosecutorial nullification, like jury 
nullification, can also be abused to oppress members of vulnerable or unpopular groups. 
See, e.g., Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 119 (2007) (recounting 
historical accounts of when “all-white juries routinely and defiantly nullified DOJ prosecu-
tions” in civil rights cases). 
130 Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1555; see also Davis, supra note 2, at 170 (“[T]he power 
to be lenient is the power to discriminate.”). Another potential danger of nullification is 
that it could result in “underenforcement” that disadvantages disfavored groups. See Alex-
andra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1715, 1764 (2006). 
131 See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 
1552, 1559–60; Vorenberg, supra note 46, at 652. 
132 See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text. 
1276 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1243 
prosecution in some instances.133 The grand jury presentment, how-
ever, is largely extinct.134 A second, independent prosecutor might be 
in a position to conduct a previously-declined prosecution.135 Further-
more, in rare circumstances, a private prosecutor may be able to carry 
forward a prosecution that a public prosecutor declined to bring.136 
Finally, some have suggested implementing judicial review of decisions 
not to prosecute.137 In the end, however, only those external actors with 
the ability to step in and usurp the prosecutorial function are likely to 
constrain prosecutorial nullification in any meaningful way. Pressure 
from external lobbying may persuade prosecutors to prosecute cases 
they otherwise would have declined, but given prosecutors’ unreview-
                                                                                                                      
133 See Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 91, at 868. But see Vorenberg, supra note 46, at 
678–79 (“While supporters of the grand jury system talk of runaway grand juries which 
keep the prosecutor honest, it is rare for a grand jury to insist on an indictment the prose-
cutor does not want.”). The prosecutor, however, must sign the indictment. Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 7(c)(1); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965). 
134 See generally Renée B. Lettow, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 Yale L.J. 
1333 (1994). For an argument that the grand jury is positioned to aid the prosecutor in 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—and, perhaps, when to nullify, see generally Fair-
fax, supra note 15; see also Fairfax, supra note 59, at 323–356 (proposing various ways in 
which the grand jury can be adapted to serve the needs of modern criminal justice). 
135 See Kadish & Kadish, supra note 2, at 81 (“[T]he prosecutor’s accountability is 
sharply limited.”) (referring to provisions that allow for the removal and prosecution of a 
prosecutor as a remedy against “prosecutorial nonenforcement decisions” and for the state 
attorney general to overrule the prosecutor’s declination). In New York, when the Bronx 
D.A. refused to seek the death penalty in the murder of a police officer, the Governor 
removed him from the case and installed a replacement. Ann LoLordo, Prosecutor Sticks to 
His Convictions, Balt. Sun, Mar. 25, 1996, at 2A. 
136 See Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 91, at 868–70 (mentioning grand jury and pri-
vate prosecution). The fact that the government prosecutor is solely authorized to bring 
charges means that a decision not to prosecute essentially shields the putative defendant 
from criminal liability. See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 349; Richard A. Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law 845–46 (8th ed. 2011). But see Fairfax, supra note 52, at 423–27. 
137 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2, at 216–17; Roger P. Joseph, Note, Reviewability of Prose-
cutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 130, 146–47 (1975). Courts, how-
ever, have been generally hostile—on separation of powers and other grounds—to re-
quests that courts prompt prosecutorial action. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 
480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by 
the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal pro-
ceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or whether to dismiss a proceeding once 
brought.”); Nat’l Dist. Att’ys Ass’n, The Prosecutor’s Screening Function: Case 
Evaluation and Control 5 (1973) (“The Court cannot compel [the prosecutor] to 
prosecute a complaint, or even an indictment, whatever his reasons for not acting.”) (quot-
ing Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634–35 (1961)); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1546; cf. 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). Additionally, there remains the question of 
standing. Interestingly, in some jurisdictions, judges have authority to nullify a prosecutor’s 
decision to prosecute. See, e.g., State v. Hermann, 402 A.2d 236, 239 (N.J. 1979); People v. 
Garcia, 482 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 
2011] Prosecutorial Nullification 1277 
able discretion to decline prosecution, such pressure would be unable 
to force a determined prosecutor to pursue a case. 
2. Disclosure and Transparency 
 Another challenge to regulating prosecutorial nullification is that 
it typically results from a low-visibility charging decision.138 Although 
some high-profile cases are followed by the media or publicized by the 
victim, most charging decisions are not exposed to public scrutiny. This 
increases the chances that the power to engage in prosecutorial nullifi-
cation could be abused. A requirement that prosecutors record and 
publicly explain all declinations might address this concern and en-
hance prosecutorial accountability.139 Requiring the prosecutor to put 
on the record her reasons for declining to prosecute could better in-
form the public (including potential voters) and, perhaps, oversight 
committees about whether the prosecutorial nullification power is be-
ing utilized appropriately. 
 While the information gleaned from such public explanations 
would be invaluable,140 such a reporting policy has the potential to be 
overly burdensome and unworkable given the many prosecutorial deci-
sions likely subject to the disclosure requirement. It is not advisable to 
impose a declination reporting requirement on prosecutors that would 
impede their ability to prosecute the many cases they choose to pursue. 
Of course, the reporting requirement could be limited to instances of 
prosecutorial nullification rather than prosecutorial declination more 
generally. This, however, would place the assessment of what is nullifica-
tion in the hands of the very prosecutor the public is seeking to monitor. 
 Some commentators have proposed community review boards, 
made up of members of the bar and community, which would periodi-
cally review a cross-section of prosecutorial decisions.141 A cross-section 
                                                                                                                      
138 See Davis, supra note 103, at 443, 448; Fairfax, supra note 52, at 444; Miller & Wright, 
supra note 103, at 129; Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1546. As discussed above, the ability to 
discern an instance of nullification is at its nadir in the context of undercharging and dec-
linations pursuant to plea agreements. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
139 See Fairfax, supra note 52, at 453 & n.146; see also Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prose-
cutorial Discretion, 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 369, 373 (2010); Gold, supra note 101, 
at 94 (proposing a requirement that prosecutors disclose costs associated with the conse-
quences of prosecutorial decisions); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1565–66; Wright & Miller, 
supra note 97, at 1609. 
140 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
227, 308 (2006); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1253, 
1279–84 (2009). 
141 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 98, at 184–86; Fairfax, supra note 52, at 453–54. 
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of cases, however, is unlikely to capture isolated instances of prosecuto-
rial nullification. Furthermore, it would likely be unfeasible for these 
boards to conduct a comprehensive review of all prosecutorial declina-
tions. In the end, bureaucratic burdens and resource limitations would 
likely frustrate the effectiveness of disclosure and transparency as a way 
to effectively regulate prosecutorial nullification. 
3. Guiding Prosecutorial Nullification 
 One by-product of acknowledging prosecutorial nullification as a 
distinct species of prosecutorial discretion is that we can attempt to 
guide it just as we have attempted to do with prosecutorial discretion.142 
Although various prosecutorial guidelines have not had the impact 
some may have anticipated,143 they do represent clear and objective 
expectations applicable to prosecutorial conduct.144 Because few legal 
standards govern prosecutorial discretion generally, it is difficult to po-
lice prosecutorial nullification. Indeed, Professor Donald Dripps has 
argued for disclosure of “public and enforceable criteria for the exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion.”145 According to Professor Dripps, 
“[p]eople have a right to know the law, and if the real law is made by 
prosecutors, then people have a right to know which criminal statutes 
the legislature has authorized prosecutors to nullify.”146 
 Furthermore, some criminal statutory schemes establish, limit, or 
define discretion (e.g., capital punishment statutes), but most make no 
affirmative statement directing prosecutors in their enforcement dis-
cretion.147 Perhaps legislatures could draft statutes that explicitly direct 
                                                                                                                      
 
142 See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 52, at 450–52; Pound, supra note 104, at 927; Vorenberg, 
supra note 6, at 1562–65. 
143 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 n.9 (1978) (noting the “many 
recommendations that the prosecutor’s discretion should be controlled by means of either 
internal or external guidelines”); Abrams, supra note 35, at 2; Sara Sun Beale, The New 
Reno Bluesheet: A Little More Candor Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion, 6 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 310, 
310–11 (1994); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative 
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 246, 291, 296 (1980); Michael A. Simons, 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 899–901 (2000). 
144 Non-governmental groups such as bar associations and advocacy organizations have 
proposed prosecutorial guidelines. See, e.g., Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Racial Dispari-
ties in Federal Prosecutions at ii (2010) (proposing prosecutorial guidelines designed 
to reduce racial and ethnic disparities in the criminal justice system); Fairfax, supra note 
52, at 450–51 & n.139. 
145 Dripps, supra note 30, at 1176. 
146 Id. 
147 See Greenawalt, supra note 1, at 349. 
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prosecutors to enforce the law. In addition, jurisdictions might prom-
ulgate guidelines requiring that prosecutors charge every (or at least 
the most serious) provable offense.148 
 Finally, once we acknowledge that prosecutors can and do make 
declination decisions on grounds unrelated to the sufficiency of the 
evidence, perhaps we should facilitate the input of various stakeholders 
in the prosecutor’s decision. While it would be inadvisable and un-
wieldy to have community representatives weigh in on a prosecutor’s 
decision whether to nullify, there might be a formal opportunity for the 
victim, law enforcement, and, in appropriate cases, even defense coun-
sel to lobby the prosecutor who signals that she is considering nullifica-
tion in a given case.149 
4. Selection of Prosecutors 
 One may reasonably be unconvinced that the aforementioned me-
chanisms will be effective in easing concerns with prosecutorial nullifi-
cation. In any event, there are very few tools at the disposal of those 
who would seek to regulate or constrain prosecutorial nullification. In 
the end, there is little, if anything, to prevent a prosecutor from declin-
ing a prosecution when he disagrees with the law or would like to avoid 
application of the law in a given case.150 Even where there are ex post 
mechanisms to force prosecution or impose sanctions when a prosecu-
                                                                                                                      
For many crimes, no heavy presumption exists in favor of prosecution; for 
these, one may speak of prosecutors as possessing an implicit delegated dis-
cretion to decide whether to go forward. A presumption may exist in favor of 
enforcement for more serious offenses, but even for them a failure to pro-
ceed cannot be described as a violation of any legal duty. 
Id. 
148 See, e.g., Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecu-
tors 2 (Sept. 22, 2003) (continuing DOJ policy of requiring prosecutors “to charge and 
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that are supported by the 
facts of the case”); see also Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 
Stan. L. Rev. 295, 297 n.18 (2001); Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1566–67; Vorenberg, supra 
note 46, at 651–52; Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Necessity: The Ash-
croft Memorandum’s Curtailment of the Prosecutor’s Duty to “Seek Justice,” 90 Cornell L. Rev. 
237, 239 (2004). But see Bibas, supra note 101, at 962. 
149 Cf. Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1565 (suggesting “screening conferences” as a me-
chanism for defense counsel to discuss charging decisions with prosecutors). 
150 See Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain Official Action?, 45 
Ga. L. Rev. 769, 787 (2010). In addition, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from liabil-
ity associated with charging decisions. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 260 
(1993); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 15 Touro L. Rev. 1643, 1643–44 (1999); Fairfax, supra note 52, at 454 n.149. 
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tor has nullified, it is nearly impossible to identify instances of nullifica-
tion when pretextual declination rationales can so easily be ad-
vanced.151 Given that there are so few controls, it may come down to 
trusting that those in the position to engage in prosecutorial nullifica-
tion will do so responsibly.152 
 What qualities should we seek in those attorneys entrusted with 
the power to nullify? In addition to enforcement priorities, courtroom 
experience, and other attributes commonly vetted, prosecutor candi-
dates could be probed regarding their views toward the use of prosecu-
torial nullification to frustrate enforcement of disfavored laws or to de-
liver mercy in individual cases. We also might want to know whether the 
prosecutor would be amenable to informing the public when he has 
engaged in prosecutorial nullification. Certainly those prosecutors who 
are appointed with the advice and consent of a legislative body go 
through a confirmation process in which these relevant questions could 
be posed.153 Those prosecutors who are elected directly, theoretically, 
could be engaged by the voters during electoral campaigns.154 
 Where electoral politics fail us or provide perverse incentives to 
prosecutors,155 perhaps “hiring boards” comprised of community rep-
resentatives could help increase community involvement in the selec-
tion of prosecutors. This mechanism could also be used to advise chief 
prosecutors on the civil service hiring of assistant prosecutors. We also 
might strive to enhance community education about the prosecutorial 
role and the immense power associated with the exercise of prosecuto-
rial discretion as well as prosecutorial nullification. A populace with the 
understanding of prosecutorial nullification’s significance for govern-
mental authority and criminal justice administration is more likely to 
remain vigilant to ensure that the power is not abused. 
                                                                                                                      
151 See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text. 
152 See Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1551–52; Wright & Miller, supra note 97, at 1589 
(“Because individual responsibility is the origin of good behavior among prosecutors, it 
does not generate the level of public trust that one might expect in a government of 
laws.”). 
153 See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 1567. 
154 But see supra 97–104; Gold, supra note 101, at 69. 
155 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 101, at 582–83; Siddharta Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C. 
McCannon, The Effect of the Election of Prosecutors on Criminal Trials 32–33 (Oct. 12, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at ssrn.com/abstract=1641345. 
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Conclusion 
 Whether one is prepared to embrace prosecutors’ ability to nullify 
our criminal laws, prosecutorial nullification is an unavoidable by-
product of our system of robust prosecutorial discretion and deserves 
distinct conceptual treatment. Once prosecutorial nullification is ac-
knowledged as a distinct species of prosecutorial discretion, it becomes a 
salient consideration when determining to whom we entrust prosecuto-
rial power and how we view similar exercises of discretion by other 
criminal justice actors. Prosecutors have the power to not only pick and 
choose which individual cases and defendants will be charged but, more 
fundamentally, which of our laws will be enforced at all. Given the tre-
mendous power prosecutors wield, we must bolster our efforts to ensure 
that their extraordinary exercises of discretion are consistent with the 
rule of law, and as transparent, accountable, and fair as possible. We 
must seek prosecutors with not only legal skill and acumen, but the 
more elusive attributes of wisdom, fair-mindedness, and good judgment. 
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